ENGLISH MATRIMONIAL CRUELTY LAW
IN NIGERIA: DEAD OR ALIVE?
D. A. Ijalaye*
The Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree of 1970' suggests farreaching innovations in Nigeria's matrimonial cruelty law. Of particular
interest is its divergence from English matrimonial provisions, which,
until 1970, had been incorporated automatically into the Nigerian law.
Although the 1970 Decree marks the beginning of a separate body of
matrimonial law in Nigeria, the influence of English jurisprudence is
likely to continue, particularly with respect to matrimonial cruelty. To
what extent that influence will now be felt in Nigeria has not yet been
made clear by the courts. It would seem desirable that Nigerian matrimonial cruelty law develop somewhat independently of the English law
because of obvious cultural and social differences. Simply put, conduct
that may constitute cruelty in England may be no more than an accepted
mode of behavior in Nigeria, and perhaps, vice versa.
This article will examine the 1970 Decree, particularly by comparing
it with the English Divorce Reform Act of 1969,2 to which it bears a
close resemblance. In turn, the English and Nigerian case law respecting
matrimonial cruelty will be considered. By way of introduction, a brief
discussion of the Nigerian statutory provisions, now superseded by the
1970 Decree, and the English divorce law to which the Nigerian statute
conformed may prove useful.
THE IMPACT OF ENGLISH MATRIMONIAL LAW IN NIGERIA

The English Matrimonial Causes Act of 19651 provided that "a
petition for divorce may be presented . . .on the ground that the re-

spondent has since the celebration of the marriage treated the petitioner
with cruelty." 4 Before the enactment of the 1970 Decree, the divorce law
of England was incorporated into the Nigerian law by virtue of the
*Lecturer in Law, University of Ife, Nigeria; LL.B., Hull University; LL.M., University of
London. Mr. Ijalaye is presently a J.S.D. candidate at the Columbia Law School.
'Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970 (Decree No. 18 of Mar. 17, 1970), 57 Official Gazette Extraordinary A 61 (Supp. No. 15, 1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Decree].
'Divorce Reform Act 1969, c. 55 (effective Jan. I, 1971).
'Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, c. 72.
11d. § l(a)(iii), at 1581. Cruelty was first made a ground for divorce under the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1937, I Edw. 8 & I Geo. 6, c. 57, § 2. This provision was later to be found in the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1950, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 25, § I(I)
(c). Prior to the 1937 statute, cruelty
had been a ground only for divortium a mensa etthoro, which was merely judicial separation.
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Regional Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act of 19581 which provided:
The jurisdiction of the High Court of a region in relation to . . .
matrimonial causes shall, subject to the provisions of any laws of a
region so far as practice and procedure are concerned, be exercised by
the court in conformity with the law and practicefor the time being
in force in England.' (emphasis added)

Section 16 of the High Court of Lagos Act7 contains a similar provision,
applicable to the Federal Territory of Lagos.'
The foregoing provisions made it incumbent on the Nigerian courts
to administer matrimonial causes "inconformity with the law and practice for the time being in force in England." 9 In Taylor v. Taylor," the
West African Court of Appeal construed this phrase to mean that "the
law and practice in Nigeria change as the law and practice in England
change."" Two distinguished writers have observed that the phrase "for
the time being in force" had a timeless effect, so as to bring into Nigeria
all future laws which the English Parliament might enact. 2 In effect, the
English Matrimonial Causes Acts of 1950,1 1963,1 and 1965 t1 applied
in Nigeria as did English cases dealing with matrimonial matters.
The English Divorce Reform Act of 1969 t 1 would have automatically
become the law of Nigeria by virtue of the "incorporation clauses" but
for the provision in the 1970 Decree which specifically states:
After the commencement of this Decree a matrimonial cause shall not
be instituted otherwise than under this Decree; and if a matrimonial
cause has been instituted before the commencement of this Decree but
'[1958] Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, c. 177.
61d. § 4, at 3207.
7[19581 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, c. 80.
'Lagos is now a state.
'in Odiase v. Odiase, [1965] N.M.L.R. 196, 198 (W. Nigeria), J. Fatayi Williams observed: "[bly
the provisions of section 4 of the Regional Courts Federal Jurisdiction Act, Parliament . . .not
only conferred jurisdiction in matrimonial causes on the High Court . . .it also provided for the
laws to be administered by the court in respect thereof." In addition, see Adeoye v. Adeoye, [1961]
I All N.L.R. 792 (N. Nigeria); and Omole v. Omole. [1960] N.R.N.L.R. 19 (N. Nigeria 1959).
0"119351 2 W.A.C.A. 348 (W. Afr.).
"Id. at 349.
' 2A. KASUNMU & J. SALACUSE, NIGERIAN FAMILY LAW 12 (1966) [hereinafter cited as A.
KASUNMU].
I"Matrimonial Causes Act 1950, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 25.
"English Matrimonial Causes Act 1963, c. 45.
'"English Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, c. 72.
'"in Harrison Obafemi v. Harrison Obafemi, [1965] N.M.L.R. 447 (Lagos), for example, J.
Omolulu held that the English Matrimonial Causes Act of 1963 applied in Nigeria by virtue of
the High Court of Lagos Act [1958], Laws of the Federation of Lagos and Nigeria, c. 80, § 16.
'"Divorce Reform Act 1969, c. 55.

19731

NIGERIAN

MATRIMONIAL

LAW

not completed, it shall be continued and dealt with only in accordance
with the provisions of this Decree prescribed in that behalf. 8
It should be pointed out, however, that prior to the 1970 Decree the
importation of the English law had always been subject to some restriction. For example, section 16 of the High Court of Lagos Act" provided
that the English law should be applied "subject to the provisions of this
Act." 20 The Lagos High Court in Elumeze v. Elumeze2' observed that
the phrase shows that the law and practice in England were not to be
accepted in toto, but only insofar as there were no other provisions
applicable and, in any case, subject to the High Court of Lagos Act.
The court then went further to explain that section 16 of the High Court
of Lagos Act was made subject to section 90 of that Act, which provides:
[N]othing in this Act and . . . nothing in rules of court made under

this Act, shall affect the mode of giving evidence by the oral examination of witnesses or the rules of evidence .... 2
The effect of section 90, according to C. J. Taylor, was that the Nigerian
rules of evidence were not to be affected by English law imported by
virtue of section 16 of the High Court of Lagos Act.2" Subject to these
limitations, however, the English matrimonial laws and rules had, until
1970, always applied with equal force in Nigeria.
THE PRESENT STANDARD FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND
AND NIGERIA

Under both the Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree of 19704 and
the English Divorce Reform Act of 1969,5 the old grounds for divorce
have been abolished, and the dissolution of a marriage will now be
granted solely "upon the ground that the marriage has broken down
irretrievably."" Although the concept of fault (cruelty) as a specific and
'11970 Decree § 1(l), 57 Official Gazette Extraordinary A 61, at A 63 (Supp. No. 15, 1970)
(Nigeria).
1[1958] Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, c. 80, at 1581.
"'The Regional Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act 1958, [1958] Laws of the Federation of Nigeria
and Lagos, c. 177, § 4, contained a similar phrase: "subject to the provisions of any laws of a region
so far as practice and procedure are concerned ..
"
"Suit No. HD/41.64 (Lagos, April 10, 1967) (unreported).
2
High Court of Lagos Act, [1958] Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, c. 80, § 90, at
1608.
2
"Elumeze v. Elumeze, Suit No. HD/41.64 (Lagos, April 10, 1967) (unreported).
21 1970 Decree (Decree No. 18 of Mar. 17, 1970), 57 Official Gazette Extraordinary A 61 (Supp.
No. 15, 1970).
" Divorce Reform Act 1969, c. 55.
2 1970 Decree, § 15(l), 57 Official Gazette Extraordinary A61, at A68 (Supp. No. 15, 1970);
Divorce Reform Act 1969, c. 55, § I, at 1603.
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sufficient ground for divorce is now dead, it would nevertheless appear
that the concept will continue to rule us from its grave, as do the old
English forms of action. Under the Nigerian Decree and the English
Act, the court hearing a petition for divorce shall not hold the marriage
to have broken down irretrievably unless the petitioner satisfies the
court as to the existence of one or more facts, which include:
that since the marriage the respondent has behaved in such a way that
the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent .... 1
This provision simply adopts the definition of matrimonial cruelty formulated in the landmark English case of Gollins v. Gollins.28 In that
case Lord Pearce observed that conduct in order to be cruel must be
such that the petitioner "should not [reasonably] be called on to endure
it.''29

It follows that under section 15(2)(c) of the 1970 Decree,30 the concept of matrimonial cruelty is preserved, and its proof is still important;
what has changed is the effect of such proof. A marriage may not
necessarily be dissolved solely because one spouse has been cruel to
another. Yet the proof of cruelty may be crucial in showing the marriage
to have broken down irretrievably. Although section 16(l) of the 1970
Decree 3' prescribes some instances in which the Nigerian courts must
hold that the petitioner has met the test of intolerable behavior in section 15(2)(c), 32 it also specifically provides that the instances given are
merely examples "without prejudice to the generality of section
15(2)(c)." In other words, the court is called upon to consider any other
conduct by the respondent so intolerable that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to endure it. It is clear, then, that the Nigerian cases
which have defined matrimonial cruelty will continue to be relevant.
271970 Decree, § 15(2)(c), 57 Official Gazette Extraordinary A 61, at A 68 (Supp. No. 15, 1970).
Divorce Reform Act 1969, c. 55, § 2(l)(b), is identical in its language, except that it omits the
phrase, "since the marriage."
2-11964] A.C. 644 (1963).
2
d. at 695: see Le Brocq v. Le Brocq, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1085 (C.A.). There Lord Justice Harman
said that "the conduct complained of must be something which an ordinary man-or a jury...
-would describe as 'cruel.' " Id. at 1089. The Le Brocq formulation was impliedly followed in
the Nigerian case, Oshin v. Oshin, Suit No. 1/270/1964 (W. Nigeria, Nov. 4, 1966) (unreported).
For a more complete discussion of the Le Brocq decision in connection with Gollins, see pp. 108109 infra.
:111970 Decree, § 15(2) (c), 57 Official Gazette Extraordinary A 61, at A 68 (Supp. No. 15,
1970). An excerpt from this provision accompanies note 27 supra.
:"d. at A 69.
:"Section 16(l )(a), for example, provides that the standard of unreasonable behavior of section
15(2)(c) is met if, since the marriage, the respondent has committed rape, sodomy, or bestiality.
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THE RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT

According to the cases, matrimonial cruelty is that conduct of an
individual which causes danger to the life, limb, or the physical or
mental health of that individual's spouse, or causes a reasonable apprehension of such danger. This rule was established in England3 3 and was
followed in the Nigerian decision of Mgbakor v. Mgbakor.31 In
Mgbakor the petitioner alleged that respondent-husband refused to pay
her medical expenses or to care for her sick baby. The petitioner also
alleged that the respondent's conduct caused the death of the baby and
the petitioner's mental strain, both of which contributed to the petitioner's serious illness. Holding the respondent's conduct to constitute
cruelty, the trial judge said that "legal cruelty is conduct of such a
character as to cause danger to life, bodily or mental, or as to give rise
to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. '35 In Mehlhaff v.
Mehlhaff t the principle was stated another way:
To constitute cruelty, the misconduct on the part of the offending
spouse must be so grave and weighty as to cause injury to the health
of the other3 7spouse or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of
such injury.
It has been observed that the court in Johnson v. Johnson31 found
the respondent's conduct not to constitute cruelty because no injury to
health or the threat of such injury was proved by the wife.3" Conduct
which causes injury nevertheless may not be cruel unless it is weighty
and grave, a matter to be decided objectively.40 Thus, whether the respondent's conduct is weighty and grave may be partly determined by
the respondent's awareness, either actual or constructive, that injury to
the other spouse would result. 4 Moreover, the respondent's awareness
must take into account any susceptibilities peculiar to the injured
spouse. As Justice Reynolds observed in Mgbakor v. Mgbakor,42 "the
conduct must be judged up to a point by a reference to the victim's
*'See. e.g.. Russell v. Russell, [1897] A.C. 395, 401, 405.
[19591 E.N.L.R. 37 (E. Nigeria).
:'1ld. at 38.
a"Suit No. 1/225/1965 (W. Nigeria, April 29, 1966) (unreported).
371d.
-[19611 L.L.R. II (Lagos).
supra note 12, at 135.
'"See. e.g.. Gollins v. Gollins [1964] A.C. 644, 695 (1963); P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW 94-95 (3d
ed. 1966).
4
See p. 104 infra concerning respondent's intention.
[19591 E.N.L.R. 37 (E. Nigeria).

"A. KASUNMU,
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capacity for endurance insofar as that capacity is or ought to have been
known to the guilty spouse.'' 4
Additionally, to establish cruelty it must be clearly proved that the
petitioner's injury was caused by the conduct of the respondent. A case
in point is Olukoya v. Olukoya," where the petitioner established injury
to health, but failed to show that respondent's refusal to have sexual
intercourse was the cause thereof. The petition was denied on the ground
that legal cruelty cannot be inferred.4 5 Nor will injurious conduct, although grave and weighty, constitute cruelty if the conduct was perpetrated with the consent of the complaining spouse. For example, in
Thompson v. Thompson" the husband, with his wife's consent, inflicted
minor wounds upon her in the course of a ritual. In the words of the
court:
[The petitioner] consented to this pagan and superstitious nonsense
because she wished to show her love for the respondent. If she suffered
headaches and pains she has herself to thank for agreeing to this "juju"
affair. The doctrine volenti non fit injuria would operate to bar her
complaint. 7
While no exhaustive list can be compiled of acts or conduct which
amount to cruelty, one thing is certain: conduct to be grave and weighty
must not come within what Lord Asquith described as the "ordinary
' However, it is not difficult to
wear and tear of married life." 48
prove
cruelty where the acts take the form of physical violence resulting in
injury. In Barker v. Barker,49 for example, the court said that "[tihere
are some injuries which speak for themselves. If a woman has a head
"Id. at 39: see Waters v. Waters, [1956] P. 344, 356 (Lord Merriman, P.): "[One had to take
the whole story . . having regard to the character and susceptibilities of the parties ....
"
The rule here bears a close resemblance to the "thin skull" principle of tort law. The classic
statement of that principle is in Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 679: "If a man is
negligently run over or otherwise negligently injured in his body, it is no answer to the sufferer's
claim for damages that he would have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had not had an
unusually thin skull or unusually weak heart."
[1961] W.N.L.R. 209 (W. Nigeria).
'Id. Causation was apparently more easily established in Sheldon v. Sheldon, [1966] P. 62
(where the husband's persistent refusal of sexual intercourse was held to be cruelty) and in Odiase
v. Odiase, (1965] N.M.L.R. 196 (W. Nigeria) (where refusal of sexual intercourse and long absences from home were held to be cruelty).
"[1961] I All N.L.R. 496 (Lagos).
17
1d. at 498. The introduction by one spouse of "juju" into the home without the consent of the
other, however, has been held to be cruelty. David v. David, Suit No. HD/46/63 (Lagos, July I1,
1966) (unreported).
"Buchler v. Buchler, [1947] P. 25, 45 (1946).
'[19491 P. 219 (1948).
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broken with a hatchet, one does not have to call a doctor to say that it
has caused danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental." ' "
It is not necessary, however, that actual violence or injury always
occur. An accumulation of minor acts, not individually sufficient to
constitute cruelty, may be considered cruel conduct." In the Nigerian
case of Williams v. Williams, 2 the Supreme Court observed:
Cruelty is in its nature a cumulative charge and so an accumulation
of minor acts of ill-treatment causing or likely to cause the suffering
spouse to break down under strain constitutes the offence; thus cruelty
may consist in the aggregate of the acts alleged in a petition and each
paragraph need not allege an independent act of cruelty.53
The court further observed that even in the absence of physical violence,
medical evidence is not essential where there is an obvious injury:
While it is desirable that medical evidence should be called where the
petitioner relies on actual injury in proof of cruelty, it is not sine qua
non to the proof of legal cruelty which is necessary to warrant a
dissolution of marriage. To hold otherwise would indeed amount to
abandonment of duty of the court in preference to medical opinion.
The court should consider the entire evidence before it and although
no specific instance of actual violence is given in evidence, it should
be able on any objective appraisal of the evidence before it, to say
whether or not the conduct of the respondent is of such character as is
likely to cause or produce reasonable apprehension of danger to life,
limb or health on the part of the petitioner. 4
An interesting question is whether conduct which constitutes cruelty
in England would necessarily constitute cruelty in Nigeria. Professors
Kasunmu and Salacuse have observed:
Nigerian courts have hitherto followed the English cases rigidly in
deciding whether or not a conduct is so grave and weighty as to amount
to cruelty. It is, however, submitted that the local culture, values and
social conditions must be taken into consideration in deciding whether
a particular conduct is grave and weighty. If this is done, the occasional chastisement of a wife might not necessarily amount to cruelty
since such conduct by the husband, so long as it is reasonable, is
5
5

tolerated.

1"1d. at 224 (Lord Merriman, P.).

51Udom v. Udom, [1962] L.L.R. 112, 121 (Lagos) (Coker, J.).
2
Suit No. SC/339/1965 (Sup. Ct. Nigeria, Jan. 14, 1966) (unreported).
Id.
"1Id.: accord, Mehlhaffv. Mehlhaff, Suit No. 1/225/1965 (W. Nigeria, April 29, 1966) (Agoola,

J.M.) (unreported).
"A. KASUNMU, supra note 12, at 134.
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This approach is well-reasoned, and it is gratifying to note that some
Nigerian cases have already adopted this attitude. In Animashaun v.
A nimashaun5 1 the court held that "[c]ruelty in the law of divorce means
cruelty in the ordinary and natural meaning of the law. The conduct
complained of must be something which an ordinary man or jury would
describe as cruel." 57 The "ordinary man" here can only be the ordinary
man in Nigeria-an objective test.
The locus classicus on this point is the case of Oyinlola v. Oyinlola.8
There the Ibadan High Court examined the situation of the respondent's
bringing friends to visit without first notifying or consulting with his
wife. In response to the wife's petition for divorce, Justice Somulu
declared:
[T]his complaint seems to me to be rather childish indeed and the
petitioner in raising it does not seem to take into consideration the
reality of life in this country to the effect that friends and relations
often come into the house either on a brief visit or fairly long stay
without previous notice .

. .

. It will be an extreme of bad manners

to turn them back or out; and to insist that they must give prior notice
is to lay [the] householder open to a charge of arrogance and callousness or what you like. It is only the process of education that can help
to modify this attitude in the people and until that change comes, it is
my view that all people in this part whether married or not must put
up with it as best as they can. It may be inconvenient or an embarrassment, but to make it a charge in a matrimonial suit is to exhibit an
attitude of prudery which I find difficult to understand in a woman of
the background of the petitioner. What does she want? She wants to
live the life of a European in Africa, and demand that her visitors
should give prior notice and fix time for it. 9
The Oyinlola decision confirms the view that a determination of what
behavior constitutes matrimonial cruelty must take into account all the
circumstances surrounding the marriage, particularly the general habit
and social custom of the people.
THE RESPONDENT'S INTENTION

Until recent years the English and Nigerian decisions held that cruelty could not be established unless there was evidence that the respon'6[7 19661 N.M.L.R. 186 (Lagos).
. Id. at 187; accord, Obayemi v. Obayemi, [1967] N.M.L.R. 212 (Sup. Ct. Nigeria); Addy v.
Addy, Suit No. CAW/21/67 (Ct. App. W. Nigeria, Feb. 13, 1968) (unreported); Oshin v. Oshin,
Suit No. 1/270/1964 (W. Nigeria, Nov. 4, 1966) (unreported).
"'Suit No. 1/293/62 (W. Nigeria, May 13, 1963) (unreported).
.. 1d.
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dent's conduct arose from specific intent to harm the petitioner."° However, actual intent was not required; the respondent's unreasonable indifference to the consequences of his injurious conduct was sufficient.
Where the court finds that the conduct complained of was pursued with
an actual intention to injure the other spouse, no further inquiry is
necessary. But such an intention may in a proper case be inferred,
where for instance, the conduct complained of is persisted in (a) after
warning that it is having an adverse effect on the other spouse, or (b)
in circumstances in which any reasonable person would appreciate that
it was likely to injure the other spouse.6
The importance accorded the respondent's intent created serious difficulties. Professor Bromley has hypothesized:
Suppose that a husband savagely assaults his wife during a fit of
insanity when he is not in control of his actions, or makes his wife
mentally ill by ignoring and humiliating her, not out of malice but as
a result of selfishly pursuing his own interests to the exclusion of hers.
Looked at from the wife's point of view, there can be said to be cruelty
in both cases; looked at from the husband's there is no conscious
2
intention to harm in either.
The conflict evidenced by Professor Bromley's observation had to be
resolved by the House of Lords in two appeals which arose in 1963:
64
Gollins v. Gollins63 and Williams v. Williams.
In Gollins, the wife discovered shortly after the marriage ceremony
that her husband was deeply in debt and unable to support her. Although she loaned him considerable sums over a period of 14 years, the
husband was continually in debt, and she was troubled by creditors and
bailiffs. The wife finally informed her husband that she could not bear
the burden of his debts and warned him to no avail that if he did not
find a job she would have to institute proceedings against him.
In Williams, the husband was mentally ill and began to hear voices
telling him that his wife was committing adultery. He made repeated
accusations against her, followed her about the house and sometimes
climbed into the loft to look for the men. This conduct injured the wife's

40E.g.. Williams v. Williams [1963] P. 212,227 (C.A. 1962). There Lord Justice Willmer declared
that "as with a criminal offense, so in the case of cruelty there must be an element of mens rea."
'Gollins v. Gollins, [1964] P. 32, 51 (C.A. 1962) (Willmer, L.J.); accord. Mgbakor v. Mgbakor,
[19591 E.N.L.R. 37 (E. Nigeria): Kaslefski v. Kaslefski, [1951] P. 38 (C.A. 1950).
11P. BROMLEY, supra note 40, at 94.
11[1964] A.C. 644 (1963).
"[1964] A.C. 698 (1963).
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health, and she petitioned for divorce. The commissioner in the court
below was prepared to find cruelty but for the M'Naghten Rule.65
The judgments in Gollins and Williams were delivered on the same
day. After reviewing the law of matrimonial cruelty in detail, the court
decided in favor of the petitioners in both cases. The rule emerged that
"if the respondent's conduct injures the petitioner's health or is likely
to do so, it will amount to cruelty if it is grave and weighty and such
that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to tolerate it." 6
Since the judgments in Gollins and Williams, it is clear that the
respondent's malevolent intention need not be shown where his alleged
conduct is clearly intolerable. Where the respondent's conduct is not
intolerable per se, his "state of . . . mind is material and may be crucial." 7 This means that the malevolent intent of the offender, while not
essential, may be a relevant factor in assessing whether particular conduct is sufficiently grave and weighty to amount to cruelty. But the
doctrine that conduct, in order to be cruel, must be aimed at the other
party has disappeared. Lord Justice Salmon observed in Le Brocq v. Le
Brocq:5
I do not consider Gollins v. Gollins as having altered the law, save that
it gave the quietus to the doctrine that conduct in order to be cruel
must be "aimed at" the party complaining. It still remains the law that
"cruelty" means "cruelty" in the real sense of that word. 69
A similar view of the ramifications of Gollins and Williams is that
[tihe old norms of "grave and weighty conduct" and "injury to health"
have been retained. What has been jettisoned is the prescribing of any
particular state of mind in the offending spouse. In future, the attitude
of mind will go only to the gravity and weight of the conduct complained of, and not stand on its own feet as a separate requisite of
cruelty. But where there is actual intention to injure or foresight that
conduct will have injurious consequences, such states of mind may in
"See id. at 700. The Rule was set out in M'Naghten's case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). There
it was held that in order "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." Id. at 722.

11P. BROMLEY, supra note 40, at 94-95.
"7See Gollins v. Gollins, [1964] A.C. 644, 667 (1963) (Reid, L.J.). Lord Reid had taken the view
more than ten years previously that "a malevolent intention while not essential to cruelty is a most
important element where it exists." King v. King, [19531 A.C. 124, 125 (1952).
"[1964] I W.L.R. 1085 (C.A.).
"Id. at 1097.
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a proper case so colour a spouse's behavior as to remove it from the
spectrum of the ordinary wear and tear of married life.70
Despite the foregoing observations, the scope of Gollins and Williams
is not free from doubt. Another writer has given both judgments controversial, but perhaps sensible, interpretations. 7 ' She states that Gollins
represents a substantial step toward establishing the rule that any conduct, however brought about, is cruel if it causes injury to health or the
apprehension of injury.7" In other words, the nature of the act does not
matter, only its result. Commenting on Williams, she observes that since
the decision, insanity is no defense to a charge of cruelty. Even if the
acts complained of were a direct result of severe mental illness, they will
still constitute cruelty if they caused injury, or apprehension of injury,
to the other spouse.7 3 In effect, divorce on the ground of cruelty is for
the protection of the innocent, and the "guilt" of the offending party is
irrelevant.74
It would appear to follow from this reasoning that a nymphomaniac
who makes incessant sexual demands upon her husband is cruel. Similarly, one should think that Gollins supports the conclusion that a husband's impotence which impairs the normal sexual activity between the
spouses amounts to cruelty. Lord Justice Salmon took quite a different
view, however, when he stated:
Nor do I consider that Gollins v. Gollins and Williams v. Williams
would compel me to hold that true impotence by itself can ever amount
to cruelty. As I understand the speeches in Gollins v. Gollins conduct
to be cruel must still be inexcusable. It is manifestly impossible to say
that a man who is impotent has no good excuse for not having sexual
intercourse with his wife. .

.

.There is . . .nothing in the actual

decision [Williams v. Williams] which would bind us to hold that
impotence which is not the husband's fault and is necessarily involuntary could be a basis for cruelty.75
In contrast to Lord Salmon's observation is the case of P. (D.) v. P. (J.)76
which applied Gollins and Williams and held correctly that a wife's
refusal to have marital intercourse constituted cruelty, even when her
7

"Brown, Cruelty without Culpability or Divorce without Fault, 26
44 (1963).
7
M. PUXON, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 120, 124-25, 134 (1967).
'id. at 120.
"Id. at 124.
"See id.
"Sheldon v. Sheldon, [1966] P. 62, 78 (C.A.).
1'[19651 2 All E.R. 456 (Div.).
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refusal was due to psychological inhibitions which the offending spouse
77
could not overcome.
As evidenced by the foregoing interpretations and discussion, there
has been some difficulty in defining the scope of the rule laid down in
Gollins and Williams. Le Brocq v. Le Brocq 71 dispelled some of the
confusion. There the Court of Appeal considered a troublesome phrase
taken from the Gollins opinion. The Commissioner in Le Brocq had
quoted Lord Pearce in Gollins as describing cruel conduct to be such
that the petitioner ought not to "have been called on to continue to
endure it." '79 It would appear from Lord Pearce's opinion, however, that
the language is more accurately quoted, "ought not [reasonably] to be
called on to endure it."' o That the language of Lord Pearce had been
taken out of context apparently went unnoticed, but the court made it
clear that reasonableness was the standard for determining cruel conduct:
[I]n this case the Commissioner was deceived by the decision of the
majority in Gollins v. Gollins. .

.

.[Tihe words which the Commis-

sioner cited from Lord Pearce's speech do seem to me to set the ball
rolling down that slippery slope which may end in the last resort in
absurdity. If everything which the wife cannot be expected to put up
with is to amount to cruelty, I do not know what conduct we may not
come to in the end. It seems to me that there must be cruel conduct
which she must not be expected to put up with before we get to that
position. ....
s.
11d. at 463.
7.[1964] I W.L.R. 1085 (C.A.) There the husband's silent and morose nature and lack of interest
in family life were found not to be cruelty. The Commission in the court below had found cruelty
on these facts. Id. at 1085, 1088.
7
"Id. at 1088, citing [19641 A.C. at 695.
"'19641 A.C. at 695. The paragraph from which the quotation was taken reads as follows:
I agree with Lord Merriman whose practice in cases of mental cruelty was always to
make up his mind first whether there was injury or apprehended injury to health. In the
light of that vital fact the court has then to decide whether the sum total of the reprehensible conduct was cruel. That depends on whether the cumulative conduct was sufficiently weighty to say thatfrorn a reasonable person's point of view after a consideration
of any excuse which this respondent might have in the circumstances, the conduct is such
that this petitioner ought not to be called on to endure it. (emphasis added)
It will be recalled that the Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree of 1970 (1970 Decree) essentially reenacts the Gollins definition of cruelty as a ground for the dissolution of marriage. Supra
notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
"Le Brocq v. Le Brocq, [1964] I W.L.R. 1085, 1092 (C.A.) (Harman, L.J.);
accord, Oshin v.
Oshin, Suit No. 1/270/1964 (W. Nigeria, Nov. 4, 1966) (unreported) (Fatayi-Williams, J.). There
it was said that "[aill things considered . . .the conduct with which the petitioner could not be
expected to put up could not constitute cruelty unless it was cruel conduct in the natural meaning
of those words."
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It is clear, then, under Gollins and Le Brocq that although the requirement of intent to injure has been eliminated from the test for cruelty,
the conduct complained of nevertheless must be found objectively to
constitute cruelty.
Gollins v. Gollins

AND THE NIGERIAN COURTS

The Nigerian Supreme Court recently considered at length the
Gollins" and Williams" decisions in the case of Obayemi v. Obayemi:"4
[I]t is not disputed that the House of Lords in Gollins v. Gollins made
it clear that the proof that the conduct was aimed at the other spouse
was not an essential requirement of cruelty but that [cruelty is established] without an intent to injure if the inexcusable conduct of one
spouse . . . reduced the other to ill health . . . whilst Williams v.
Williams . . . established that the test of whether one spouse treated

another with cruelty was wholly objective. 5
In support of its position, the court cited Le Brocq,86 wherein Lord
Harman explained that the word "cruel" is not used in any esoteric
sense; there need not be physical force, but the conduct complained of
must be something which an ordinary man or a jury would describe as
"cruel." 7 In Obayemi the Supreme Court, having warned that it was
not suggesting that the entire law of cruelty is now to be found in Gollins
v. Gollins, ruled that the test to be applied objectively is "whether this
wife has been cruel to this husband,"88 a matter to be decided only after
all the facts have been taken into account.
Similarly, in the case of Addy v. Addy,8 the court considered the
recent English decisions at length and pointed out that the question to
be answered only after a thorough survey of the situation was this: "Has
the respondent treated the other [party] with cruelty?" 0 An important
consideration in answering that question, according to the court, was
whether the respondent's alleged cruel conduct was in response to some
provocative behavior by the petitioner." The court then emphasized that
"2Gollins v. Gollins, [1964] A.C. 644 (1963).
'Williams v. Williams, [1964] A.C. 698 (1963).
-1[1967] N.M.L.R. 212 (Sup. Ct. Nigeria).
"d. at 215-16.
"Le Brocq v. Le Brocq, [1964] I W.L.R. 1085 (C.A.).
"See id. at 1089; accord, Animashaun v. Animashaun, [1966] N.M.L.R. 186 (Lagos).
1-[19671 N.M.L.R. at 216.
"Suit No. CAW/21/67 (Ct. App. W. Nigeria, Feb. 13, 1968) (unreported).
901d.
11ld.: see King v. King, [1953] A.C. 124, 134 (1952). There Lord Norman observed:
When a husband and wife have reached the stage of unending accusations and recrimina-
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a man and his wife take each other for better or for worse; only after a
survey of all the incidents in light of the entire history of the marriage
can a judge conclude whether or not cruelty has been established. 2
In the light of these decisions, it is clear that Gollins and Williams
are law in Nigeria. But it is interesting that at least two Nigerian cases
93
appear nevertheless to have followed the old rule. In James v. James
the Ibadan High Court observed:
When one spouse, out of selfishness denies the other sexual life or
refuses to take measures that would make the other enjoy sexual life
with the other, that is not itself cruelty. It will be cruelty, however, if
there is no reasonable excuse for the act of that spouse and the action
of that spouse is done with a desire to inflict misery on the other.94
In the other case, Ade-Hall v. Ade-Hall 5 Chief Justice Morgan, after
holding that cruelty had not been proved, observed: "I think that the
failure to bring food home on one occasion without any evidence of a
deliberate intention to punish the petitioner cannot be regarded as legal
cruelty."96
Both James and Ade-Hall were decided three years after Gollins v.
Gollins, and both decisions still regarded intention as a sine qua non to
the proof of cruelty. It is submitted that both decisions were given per
incuriam.9
STANDARD OF PROOF OF CRUELTY

The English Matrimonial Causes Act of 196511 requires that the court
be "satisfied on the evidence that the case for the petition has been
proved." 99 In Davis v. Davis'0 the Court of Appeal held that this provition, the wife's satisfaction in inflicting pain may be the reflex of the bitterness and pain
suffered by her and it is especially likely to occur when there have been former real
affection and and a strong bond of physical attraction between the parties.
"2 Addy v. Addy, Suit. No. CAW/21/67 (Ct. App. W. Nigeria, Feb. 13, 1968) (unreported);
accord, Sobowale v. Sobowale, Suit No. 1/4/67 (W. Nigeria, Feb. 15, 1968) (unreported). In
Sohowale Justice Ayoola found that cruelty had been proved after "[taking all the incidents
together to form a composite picture and judging them in relation to the surrounding circumstances
of [the] case ...."Suit No. 1/24/66 (W. Nigeria, June 17, 1966) (unreported).
"Ild.
(Kayode Eso, J.).
"Suit No. 1/105/65 (W. Nigeria, March 16, 1966) (unreported).
96ld.
97
No reference was made to Gollins in either case. It is noteworthy, however, that both cases
were decided before Addy and Obayemi.
"Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, c. 72.
"Id.§ 5(3), at 1584.
'"[1950] P. 125 (C.A. 1949).
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sion did not require that matrimonial cruelty be proved as strictly as is
a crime.' 0' Notwithstanding the holding, Lord Justice Bucknill appeared
to suggest the contrary by the following statement:
[Section 4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937] requires that the
court should be "satisfied, on the evidence that the case for the prosecution has been proved." I understand that to mean that, if there is
any reasonable doubt at the end of the case, then the burden of proof
has not been discharged and the decree ought not to be granted.102
The ambiguity raised by Lord Bucknill's statement appeared in a subsequent case, Bater v. Bater,03 decided by the same court. There it was
held that the trial judge did not err in directing that the petitioner must
prove cruelty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, Lord Justice Denning pointed out, it would have been error if the trial judge had said that
cruelty must be proved with the same strictness as a crime. 04 It would
appear from the context of Lord Denning's opinion that the concept
advanced by both Davis and Baler is that all cases, civil and criminal,
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but that a reasonable doubt
is greater in a civil case than in a criminal case.' Similarly, Lord
Denning's opinion suggests that the standard for proving a minor act
of cruelty is less strict than that for proving a graver act of cruelty.0 6
The clear implication is that there are degrees of proof within a particular standard. This is the principle which the House of Lords apparently
adopted in Blyth v. Blyth."'7 The court in that case, however, stated the
rule in terms more easily understood than in either Davis or Bater:
[S]o far as the grounds for divorce are concerned, the case, like any
civil case, may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but the
degree of probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as
the offense is grave, so ought the proof to be clear." 8
In Nigeria, there was in fact a double standard of proof for matrimonial causes prior to the enactment of the 1970 Decree.'" 9 Section
137(1) of the Evidence Act" 0 provided:
'The trial judge had said that a charge of cruelty must be proved with the same degree of
strictness with which a crime is proved in a criminal court. Id. at 126 (quoting the lower court).
2
'1
1d. at 127.
'-[1951] P. 35 (C.A. 1950).
0
'"
ld. at 38.
' Id. at 36-38.
1061d.
.7[1966] A.C. 643.
wId. at 669.
'1970 Decree, 57 Official Gazette Extraordinary A 61 (Supp. No. 15, 1970).
"'Evidence Act, [1958] Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, c. 62, § 137(I), at 1285.
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If the commission of a crime by a party to any proceedings is directly
in issue in any proceedings civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt."'
This language clearly indicates that proof beyond reasonable doubt
would apply only in civil cases where the commission of a crime was
directly in issue. In all other cases, the proof was to be on the balance
of probabilities. Obviously, not all acts of cruelty would amount to the
commission of a crime. Hence, proof of cruelty might be either proof
beyond reasonable doubt or proof on the balance of probabilities, depending on the facts of a particular case.
Although the English Matrimonial Causes Act of 1965,112 which re-

quires proof only to the "satisfaction of the court,"" 3 applied also in
Nigeria, it was clearly to be read and applied with section 137(1) of the
Evidence Act. Thus, proof to the satisfaction of the Nigerian courts,
where a criminal act was at issue, meant proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. The problem was that the Nigerian courts had to determine
whether or not the alleged cruelty constituted a criminal act before
determining the standard of proof to be applied.
The confusion of the "reasonable doubt" language that had arisen in
Davis and Bater was compounded still further in Nigeria by the 1968
decision of Oyedijo v. Oyedijo." 4 There the Ikeja High Court followed
Davis and held that the charge of cruelty must be proved to the satisfaction of the court and not with the degree of strictness by which a crime
is proved in a court exercising criminal jurisdiction." 5 Although this
statement of law is consonant with the Davis decision, the court apparently overlooked section 137(1) of the Nigerian Evidence Act"' which
clearly required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in the criminal sense
of the standard, when an alleged act of cruelty also constituted a crime.
Order was restored to the Nigerian law, however, by the enactment
of the 1970 Decree. Section 82(1) provides:
For the purposes of this Decree, a matter of fact shall be taken to be
proved if it is established to the reasonable satisfaction of the court." 7
The double standard of proof has been eliminated by this provision, and
cruelty should now be taken as proved upon the balance of probabilities.
"Oid.
"'Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, c. 72.
"1d. § 5(3), at 1584.
"'Suit No. IK/I 15/67 (Lagos, Jan. 31, 1968) (unreported).
""Id.
"'Evidence Act, [1958] Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, c. 62, § 137(1), at 1285.
"7970 Decree, § 82(I), 57 Official Gazette Extraordinary A 61, at A 85 (Supp. No. 15, 1970).
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CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis has attempted to provide some insight into the
evolution of matrimonial cruelty law in Nigeria. Particular attention
has been directed to the English law from which the Nigerian law developed. Heavy emphasis has also been given to the more recent developments in the case law of both countries. With the recent passage of the
1970 Decree and the English Divorce Reform Act of 1969,"1 further
changes in the law seem imminent. This paper has attempted to analyze
some of the possible effects of these acts upon matrimonial cruelty laws.
Of particular significance is the fact that the Nigerian courts need no
longer look to English law in formulating their decisions. However,
while the 1970 Decree marks a divergence from the previous format of
rigid adherence to the English matrimonial law, the influence of English
law will continue to permeate the structural development of Nigerian
law in this area. Hopefully, the influence of English law will continue
to wane in recognition of obvious cultural differences respecting the
institution of marriage. The Nigerian courts, even at this early stage of
self-development, are certainly in a better position to formulate their
own principles of law with respect to matrimonial cruelty in Nigeria
than are their English counterparts. The 1970 Decree is a significant
first step toward this formulation.
"'Divorce Reform Act 1969, c. 55.

